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In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade
unions, the central bank and the ﬁscal policymaker. We explicitly
model unions’ concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an
analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the ﬁscal pol-
icymaker and the unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts
that have characterized economic policies in a number of European
countries in the last few decades. We also highlight the profoundly
dierent incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as
the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. The for-
mer has unambiguously induced more e!cient outcomes; the latter is
likely to backﬁre!
Jel: E42, E58, E61, E62, E64, H30, J51, J58.
Keywords: Corporatism, trade unions, ﬁscal policy, monetary con-
servativeness, policy game.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions among trade unions, the
central bank and the ﬁscal policymaker. We explicitly model trade unions’
Nicola Acocella and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the
University of Rome “La Sapienza.” Patrizio Tirelli acknowledges ﬁnancial support from
MIUR 60% and MIUR 40% 2004. This research project has been also supported by a Marie
Curie Transfer of Knowledge Fellowship of the European Community’s Sixth Framework
Program under contract number MTKD-CT-014288.
1concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential
gains from cooperation between the ﬁscal policymaker and the trade unions,
i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic
policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. Following
Burda (1997), we deﬁne corporatism as a set of rules of the game, i.e. in-
stitutional arrangements that involve negotiation, bargaining, collaboration,
and accord between major economic groupings in a society, and especially
between unions and governments. Thus corporatism provides the commit-
ment technology necessary to enforce cooperative agreements between the
trade unions and the ﬁscal policymaker.
In their golden age (the 1970s and early 1980s) social pacts sought to trade
wage moderation for higher public expenditure (namely welfare expenditure)
or lower inﬂation (namely after the oil shocks).1 Earlier empirical studies
pointed out that corporatist economies post better performance in terms of
inﬂation and unemployment (Calmfors and Dri!ll, 1988) but higher levels
of taxation. In recent decades there have been rather conspicuous changes
in European industrial relations. Since 1987, when the ﬁrst of ﬁve multi-
annual pacts was stipulated in Ireland, there have been numerous formal or
informal agreements of a corporatist nature in almost all European countries,
with the major exceptions of Belgium and France. But the social pacts of the
last ﬁfteen years dier from earlier ones in at least one important respect,
since they establish reductions — rather than increases — in public expenditure
and government action to protect employment and labor rights (Regini, 1997;
Visser, 2002). Some contributions (Streek, 1998; Hancké and Rhodes, 2005)
suggest that second-generation social pacts were induced by the need to meet
the Maastricht criteria. Hancké and Rhodes (2005) also point out that social
pacts disappeared after 1999.
We revisit the case for corporatist agreements in a model where labor
markets are unionized, the government controls the ﬁscal stance, and an
independent central bank sets monetary policy. We can then analyze the
scope for a political exchange between public expenditure and wage setting
choices, showing that corporatism may generate quite dierent macroeco-
nomic outcomes from the traditional exchange between wage restraint and
high public expenditure. In fact our model can easily encompass both ﬁrst
and second-generation corporatist agreements.
Our approach stands in sharp contrast with some contributions where
the importance of institutional arrangements in shaping macroeconomic out-
1Unionized labor markets and a pervasive welfare system have long been the hallmark
of European corporatist economies (OECD, 1997; Traxler and Kittel, 2000; Rhodes, 2001;
van Poeck and Borghijs, 2001).
2comes is a key ingredient, but the focus is restricted to unilateral institutional
constraints on policymakers. Typically, central bank conservatism and insti-
tutional constraints on ﬁscal discretion are deemed to generate lower output
distortions and inﬂation (see, for instance, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998)
and Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999) These results are obtained neglecting strategic
interactions between non-atomistic wage setters and policymakers. In this
paper we reconsider the issue and show that trade unions dierentially react
to institutional arrangements such as the Maastricht criteria and the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact, SGP henceforth. To the extent that unions saw bene-
ﬁts from joining EMU, the conditionality of the Maastricht criteria favored
agreements that disciplined wage claims and public expenditures, whereas
the unilateral ﬁscal commitment implied by the SGP apparently wipes o
incentives for virtuous social pacts and is likely to have adverse eects on
wage setting behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our model. In
section 3 we derive the non-cooperative solution. In section 4 we compare
the outcomes of cooperative and non-cooperative regimes and derive a num-
ber of propositions on the desirable eects of social pacts. In section 5 we
explain the shifts from ﬁrst to second-generation social pacts, with particular
emphasis on the potential role of the Maastricht Treaty. Section 6 highlights
the dangers of unilateral ﬁscal retrenchments such as the SGP. Section 7
concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
The standard supply function is deﬁned as follows2
{ =   
h  w  ˜ { (1)
where output deviations from the competitive non-distortionary baseline
level, {, are caused by an index of tax distortions, w,r e a lw a g ed i s t o r t i o n s
due to monopolistic unions, ˜ {,3 and inﬂation surprises,   h (h deﬁnes
inﬂation expectations).
In this economy there are three players: the government, a monopoly
trade union, and the central bank.
The government’s loss function is deﬁned over inﬂation, output and public
2Equation (1) is akin to Alesina and Tabellini (1987) and Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1998). For a derivation, see Appendix A.
3More precisely, e { is the real wage mark-up over the competitive wage rate.







2 + ji (j  ˜ j)
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(2)
As in Debelle and Fischer (1994), ˜ j is interpreted as the optimal share
of non-distortionary output to be spent on public goods if non-distortionary
lump-sum taxes were available. In setting the public expenditures level, the
government faces a balanced budget constraint:4
j = w (3)
The trade union’s loss function is




jx(j  ˜ j)2
2
(4)
The union’s welfare increases with the real wage but falls with output
distortions (see Lawler, 2000a, 2000b; Cukierman, 2004).5 The assumption
that the trade union is concerned with expenditure deviations from the target
is perhaps less straightforward and requires some discussion. In fact union
members may be concerned with speciﬁc components of public expenditures,
such as pension funds, training schemes, unemployment beneﬁts, health in-
surance for workers, social policies, labor policy, and any government action
in the area of income distribution. For simplicity, we can say that the union
is interested in the level of total government expenditure. In addition, we
assume that the monopolistic union sets the labor market distortion, i.e. a
real-wage mark-up over the competitive rate. If we accept a social welfare
perspective of the government’s preferences, the loss functions (2) and (4)
will dier insofar as the government takes the preferences of non-workers
into account (as in Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998).6
Monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank (CB hence-
forth), which is interested in minimizing both the inﬂation rate and output









where p A i. We assume that the CB directly controls the inﬂation
rate.
4For the sake of simplicity we abstract from both the seigniorage component of the
budget and debt service payments.
5In the literature it is sometimes assumed that the union penalises real wage deviations
from an exogenous real wage target. This would cause minor changes in our results. See
Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004) for a discussion on the dierent speciﬁcations of the
union loss function.
6For the sake of simplicity we assume that the public expenditure targets in eq. (2)
and (4) are identical.
43 The non-cooperative solution
The timing of the game is as follows. The union and the government simulta-
neously set labor and tax distortions. After that, the CB chooses monetary
policy. The model is solved by backward induction. In Appendix C we extend
our results to the case where the government action follows the union wage-
setting decision. A graphical characterization of the Stackelberg equilibrium
is provided below (ﬁgures 1-3).
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Cw = 1+ 1
(1+p)
When choosing the ﬁscal stance, the government anticipates the CB’s
reaction to its tax policy, such that inﬂation will increase following a rise in
the tax rate. However, the government cannot internalize the simultaneous
reaction of the trade union. Thus, as explained in Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1998), taxes will be set as if the inﬂation response could partly oset output
distortions, neglecting the wage-setting reaction to taxation.
Let us now turn to union’s behavior. The log-deviation of the nominal
wage from its competitive zero-inﬂation level is z =˜ { + h (for a deriva-
tion, see Appendix A). We assume that the trade union takes j as given
and simultaneously chooses inﬂation expectations and the level of ˜ {,w h e r e
the latter minimizes (4).7 By imposing rational expectations h =  (i.e.
C{@C˜ { = 1), we obtain the trade union ﬁrst order condition:
˜ {  { =0 (8)
7This implies that the union bargains over the real wage. In the literature it is some-
times assumed that unions bargain over the nominal wage. This issue is not relevant here
because, as Lippi (2002) shows, the two assumptions may have dierent implications only
if the number of unions is greater than one.
5Corresponding Nash outcomes are:
{
Q = ˜ { (9)
˜ {
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Output distortions are policy invariant (see eq. (9)): given the tax rate,
the trade union will set the real wage distortion at a level such that (8)
holds. As a consequence, labor and tax distortions are perfect substitutes:
the output ee c to fat a xc h a n g ei sf u l l yo set by a real wage adjustment in
the opposite direction (see eq. (10)). We cannot rule out the case where the
government chooses to subsidize production (jQ ? 0). In this case the union
neutralizes the eects of a subsidy by increasing labor distortions. The more
the union is concerned with the real wage objective, the lower is the tax rate
(eq. (11)). Our results stand in sharp contrast with those obtained in models
where labor market distortions are exogenous. First of all, these models see
subsidies as a remedy to labor market distortions (Alesina and Tabellini,
1987; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). In fact, instead of raising production,
our model shows that the expectation of a subsidy would trigger a real wage
increase. Second, the expenditure bias identiﬁed in Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1998) has no impact on output distortions, which are independent of ﬁscal
policy.
4 The cooperative solution
The Nash equilibrium implies three sources of ine!ciency related to the tim-
ing of the game and the existence of externalities. First, the government
cannot internalize the impact of its actions on inﬂation expectations. Sec-
ond, the government does not internalize the real wage reaction, such that
in equilibrium C{
Cw =0 . Third, the trade union neglects the adverse eects of
its actions on the level of public expenditure.
As usual, cooperation is deﬁned as the joint minimization of a convex
combination of the dierence between the two players’ loss functions and their
outside options, i.e. the generalized Nash product
¡
J  JQ¢! ¡
X  XQ¢(13!)
with ! 5 [0>1]. For our purposes, a graphical analysis is exhaustive.
6To begin with, it is useful to identify the two players’ preferred combina-
tion of expenditure gap and output.8 For the government, this is:














Conditions (13) and (14) imply that ˜ { =0 . Moreover, they are obtained
by requiring the policymaker to take into account the adverse eect of taxes
on inﬂation expectations.
The trade union’s preferred combination of expenditure gap and output
is:
¡








Q = ˜ { (16)
jXVE is determined by the union desired trade-o between public expendi-
tures and the real wage. Note that the Nash equilibrium leads to a level of
output too low for the government, i.e. {JVE A{ Q, but we cannot say a
priori what is the relative magnitude of
¡
e j  jJVE¢
,
¡
˜ j  jXVE¢
,
¡
˜ j  jQ¢
.
For our analysis of social pacts, it is useful to distinguish the following
cases:
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˜ j  j
Q¢
(18)
irrespectively of the relative size of jJVE.
Suppose condition (17) holds. Both the government and the union beneﬁt
from
¡
e j  jF¢
?
¡
˜ j  jQ¢
, where superscript F identiﬁes cooperative out-
comes. In ﬁgure 1, the loci UJ and UX identify the combinations of output
distortions and expenditure gap that obtain along the two players’ reaction
functions, and points P, l deﬁne the outcomes9 preferred by the government
and by the trade union respectively (their second-best outcomes). Points
8See Appendix B for a derivation.
9Note that point 	 must lie above the locus UJ because in 	 the government inter-
nalizes the adverse eect of taxes on inﬂation expectations and chooses a lower level of
public expenditure (see Appendix B for a discussion).
7Q and V identify the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. With regard to the
Stackelberg equilibrium, it is worth noting that the union now internalizes
the trade o between the real wage mark-up and public expenditure. There-
fore its ability to commit to a real wage distortion leads to a better economic
performance relative to the Nash equilibrium. Further beneﬁts accrue from
cooperation. In fact cooperative equilibria, e.g. point F in ﬁgure 1,10 entail
a reduction both in output distortions and the public expenditure gap. This,
in turn, implies that the trade union is willing to discipline wage claims in
order to beneﬁt from an increase in expenditure.
Figure 1
Suppose condition (18) holds. Both the Stackelberg and the cooperative
solutions are then substantially modiﬁed (see ﬁgure 2). With regard to the
Stackelberg equilibrium, the union’s ability to internalize the trade o be-
tween the real wage mark-up and public expenditure causes an increase in
output distortions relative to the Nash equilibrium. This happens because
the trade union is now less interested in public expenditures. By contrast,
cooperation brings output distortions below the Nash equilibrium.
Figure 2
Summarizing, our model is consistent with both the old and the new forms
of social pacts. Any cooperative agreement entails a reduction in output
distortions and an increase in employment. If
¡
˜ j  jXVE¢
?
¡
˜ j  jQ¢
,t h e
government will agree to reduce the public expenditure gap (i.e., it will raise
public expenditure) in exchange for wage moderation as in the golden age
social pacts. By contrast, if
¡
˜ j  jXVE¢
A
¡
˜ j  jQ¢
> the government agrees
on a reduction in public expenditure, as all cooperative solutions must lie in
the feasibility set indicated in ﬁgure 2.
5 Explaining the shift from ﬁrst- to second-
generation social pacts
According to our model, the observed shift to second-generation pacts is
possible only if condition (18) holds, that is, if
10We take the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium as the players’ outside option of the
cooperative Nash solution in ﬁgure 1. When the union is the game leader with respect
to the government, the feasibility set has to be computed by considering the Stackelberg











In the light of eq. (19) we can discuss the potential role of some facts
which might have inﬂuenced the evolution of social pacts.
• Fall in union militancy. There is evidence that union militancy began
to fall in the 80s (see Visser, 2000), potentially disciplining wage claims
and inducing the unions to accept a reduction in public expenditure.
In our model parameter ˜ { characterizes union militancy; hence from
(19) it is clear that this would not change the nature of the political
exchange between the unions and the policymaker.
• Political change. In many European countries right-wing governments
came to power in the early Nineties (Swank, 1999). Furthermore, Pi-
azza (2001) argues that the remaining left-wing governments became
less radical, partly due to the generalized fall in union militancy. This
could have reduced governments’ concern for public expenditures and
thus one of the terms of social pacts. In our framework variations in
ji
11 can capture the impact of the political cycle on the nature of
social pacts. It is easy to see that a fall in ji, i.e. a political shift to
the right, per se makes condition (19) less likely to obtain.
• Central Bank commitment to low inﬂation. There is a widespread con-
sensus (e.g. Clarida et al., 1998) that in the 80s Central Banks adopted
a more conservative stance. In our model, the monetary policy reaction
to ﬁscal and labour market distortions aects the ﬁscal policymaker de-
cision to levy distortionary taxes. As discussed in section 3, this is the
Beetsma and Bovenberg eect, captured by changes in p.F r o mc o n -
dition (19), it is easy to see that an increase in conservatism can reduce
¡
˜ j  jQ¢




• Maastricht criteria. Second-generation social pacts became more nu-
merous in the early 1990s, after stipulation of the Maastricht Treaty,
11Alternatively, we might assume that the government is characterized by a relatively
lower public expenditure target. The results would be qualitatively identical.
12The non linear eect of a change in p is explained as follows. On the one hand,
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eB e e t s m aa n dB o v e n b e r ge ect, the government anticipates an accommo-
dating monetary response on output. Therefore an increase in conservatism disciplines
expenditures. On the other hand, the accommodating monetary policy response has an
adverse eect on inﬂation. Therefore an increase in conservatism lowers the inﬂation costs
of higher public expenditures.
9when admission to EMU was made conditional to fulﬁlment of certain
prerequisites entailing monetary policy independence, inﬂation control
and ﬁscal discipline. It is widely acknowledged that the Treaty en-
hanced the low-inﬂation commitment of many European central banks
and disciplined governments. A similar conclusion should hold for
wage-setting behavior, to the extent that unions members saw ben-
eﬁts from EMU.13 Assuming that this was indeed the case and that
the Maastricht criteria acted as an incentivating rule, in the following
we investigate whether trade union attitude towards EMU membership
can explain second-generation social pacts.
In our framework the role of the Maastricht criteria is mimicked by adding
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HX
jx j (20)











Equation (4) captures the idea that the trade union saw beneﬁts from
joining the monetary union and that they internalized the link between wage
setting behavior, fulﬁllment of the Maastricht criteria and the chances of
accession to EMU.15
































13Consider for instance the welfare gains outlined in the Cecchini report (see Cecchini,
1988). For an alternative justiﬁcation see Whyman (2002).
14The Maastricht criteria required public deﬁcit control. To the extent that this put
pressure for a reduction in public spending, in our static framework it seems appropriate
to assume that this raised the cost of attaining a certain level of public expenditure.
Buti (2006) shows that "several countries combined discretionary cuts in spending with a
reduction in tax revenue, thus reducing the overall size of the public sector" (Buti, 2006,
p.7).
15It is sometimes assumed that the union cares about inﬂation per se. This is a debated
issue since it is considered as an ad hoc assumption by many authors (e.g. Soskice and
Iversen, 2000). Here, the inclusion of inﬂation has a dierent nature. Unions care about
inﬂation to support the entrance in the monetary union.
10˜ j  j
QPD =
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The Nash equilibrium is now characterized by a fall in output distortions
and inﬂation. Trade union’s concern for EMU membership is crucial to sup-
port this result: {QPD = {Q and QPD = Q when 
HX
 =0 .16 Without
cooperation, the Maastricht criteria have an ambiguous impact on the public
expenditure gap (eq. 24): on the one hand, the ﬁscal stance is tighter be-
cause the policymaker sees more costs from increases in inﬂation and public
expenditures; on the other hand, trade unions are induced to choose a smaller
level of output distortions for any level of public expenditures (see eq. (22)),
and greater wage discipline leaves room for a looser ﬁscal policy.
By contrast, the eect of the Maastricht criteria on the trade union’s
preferred expenditure gap is unambiguously positive:
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Following the Maastricht Treaty, cooperative agreements would take the
form of second-generation pacts only if
¡
˜ j  jXVEPD¢
































˜ j  j
Q¢¤
(27)
w h e r ei ti so b v i o u s l ya s s u m e dt h a t( 1 7 )h o l d s ,i . e .
£¡
˜ j  jXVE¢

¡
˜ j  jQ¢¤
?
0.
The l.h.s. of (27) identiﬁes the dierential impact that the Maastricht
criteria have on
¡
˜ j  jXVEPD¢
and ˜ j  jQPD, conﬁrming the intuition that
second-generation pacts would have emerged only if the Maastricht criteria
had a relatively strong impact on trade unions.17 Note that if in eq. (24)
16In the Nash equilibrium coe!cient 
HX
jx in (21) is obviously irrelevant. It would play
an important role when the trade union plays Stackelberg leader vis à vis the government.
17This conclusion is reinforced for countries where commitment to low inﬂation and






















A 0,t h e nc o n -
dition (27) is more likely to hold. This leads to an intriguing and perhaps
surprising conjecture. Without cooperation, the Maastricht criteria might
have failed to discipline ﬁscal policies even though both unions and ﬁscal
policymakers recognized the importance of joining EMU. This, in turn, led
to the emergence of social pacts aiming at public expenditure control.
6 The danger of unilateral ﬁscal retrenchments:
Could the SGP backﬁre?
Earlier contributions (see Sibert, 1999; Sibert and Sutherland, 2000) have
pointed out that, while policymakers where unambiguously disciplined by
the conditionality of the Maastricht Treaty, national ﬁscal policies would
turn to a loose stance after EMU membership was obtained, unless additional
constraints were imposed on the ﬁscal policymakers. Moreover, an extensive
literature supports the view that institutional constraints on the ﬁscal stance
improve macroeconomic performance,18 providing a rationale for the Stability
and Growth Pact. In these contributions trade unions’ behavior is usually
neglected or assumed to be exogenous. In this section we show that such an
assumption is not innocuous.
Our analysis is based on the presumption that Maastricht criteria and
the SGP have a profoundly dierent inﬂuence on the trade union incentives.
As discussed in section 5, the former leave room for wage setting decisions
to aect outcomes — EMU membership — of interest to trade unions. By
contrast, the latter are unilateral decisions undertaken by governments, who
promise to adopt a certain ﬁscal stance independently from wage-setting
behavior. Furthermore, the recent history of EMU ﬁscal policies shows that
the costs of breaching the SGP rules are mainly reputational and therefore
fall entirely on the ﬁscal policymakers. We therefore assume that the unions
objective function (4) is not aected by ﬁscal precommitment.
The SGP deﬁnes deﬁcit ceilings. As pointed out in section 5 it seems
plausible that deﬁcit control ultimately translates into lower expenditures.
In the following we maintain the assumption that administrative restrictions
on the ﬁscal stance are bound to limit the level of public expenditures. In
our model this is equivalent to establishing a ﬂoor G for the government’s
18See, among others, Chari and Kehoe (1997), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 2000,
2002), Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Dixit (2001), Dixit and Lambertini (2001), and Gover-
natori and Eij!nger (2003).
12reaction function, such that ˜ j  j  J. 19 Consider a Nash equilibrium
(eq. (9)). It is easy to see that setting JA˜ j jQ would trigger a real wage
increase, leaving output distortions unaected .20 Therefore ﬁscal constraints
always reduce welfare.
A more complex picture emerges if one considers the case where unions
act as a leader vis à vis the ﬁscal policymaker (ﬁgure 3).
Figure 3
First, consider the case of an V1-type equilibrium characterized by ˜ jjV1.
It is easy to see that any J?˜ j  jV1 would not bind. By contrast, for any
JA˜ jjV1 the constraint is binding but counterproductive. Second, consider
an V2-type equilibrium. The ﬂoor is only binding for any JA˜ j  jV2,
where output distortions fall to the Nash equilibrium level. This happens
because the union no longer anticipates the trade o between wage distortion
and public expenditure gap. However, a commitment to raise expenditures
would exert an identical disciplining eect on the union, but with a lower
expenditure gap! In fact, the optimal constraint is a ceiling on the public
expenditure gap, such that Jfhlo = max{0>˜ j  ˜ {}.21
7 Concluding remarks
The impact of endogenous wage setting on macroeconomic performance can-
not be neglected in European countries. We have also shown that cooperation
between the unions and the governments can improve economic performance
and the positions of the parties. The ﬁrst key to our results lies in the con-
sideration that, in addition to the traditional objectives, i.e. the real wage
rate and employment, unions may be interested in the level of public ex-
penditure. The second key lies in our re-examination of corporatism as a
feasible set of institutional arrangements designed to internalize certain neg-
ative macroeconomic externalities. The third key is the characterization of
the government budget as a two-faced Janus, i.e. its double role of providing
public expenditure valuable for union members and extracting distortionary
taxes. The fourth key is the emphasis on the profoundly dierent incentives
19Alternatively, we might assume that, as in section 5, not fulﬁlling the SGP requirement
aects the ﬁscal policymaker’s objective function. Our results would not be aected,
because the crucial assumption is the dierential impact of the two schemes on the unions
objective function.
20As an example, consider point S in ﬁgure 3.
21It would be straightforward to show that this result obtains minimizing the Govern-
ment loss function subject to the constraints { = ˜ { and ˜ {  0.
13generated by institutional arrangements such as the Maastricht criteria, on
the one hand, and the SGP, on the other. This latter result is entirely due
to our endogeneization of the wage setting process.
Our analysis has signiﬁcant implications for the current debate on insti-
tutional reforms in Europe. Discussion of the reform of the Stability and
Growth Pact fails to consider its impact on labor market performance. Our
paper suggests that when the interdependence between ﬁscal policy and the
labor market is considered, any strategy of unilaterally placing a cap on pub-
lic expenditure is doomed to be counterproductive. In one case a commit-
ment to raise expenditures would even be preferable to a restrictive ceiling!
By contrast, corporatist institutions should be regarded as valuable tools
in enhancing macroeconomic performance, in line with the Lisbon Strategy
approach, which emphasizes the role of social partnership.
Some authors see the commitment to ﬁscal restraint as a catalyst for la-
bor market reforms that should reduce the power of unions. In this vein,
the complete liberalization of the labor market would be a complementary
solution to the Stability and Growth Pact. However, the risks should be
clear. On the one hand, the Calmfors and Dri!ll hump-shape curve sug-
gests that corporatist agreements are likely to dominate partial labor market
liberalization. On the other hand, complete deregulation may be politically
unfeasible.
Appendix A — Derivation of output equation
The representative price-taking ﬁrm maximizes its net proﬁt:
S (1  )\  ZO (A1)
where \ = Od is the production function, S and Z respectively deﬁne the
price and wage levels, and  is the sales-tax rate.
The standard ﬁrst order condition is:
S (1  )O
d31 = Z (A2)
The next step is the deﬁnition of the nominal wage rate which obtains in











deﬁnes the real wage mark-up over the competitive
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where ˜ { =l n
¡
1+X¢
, w = ln(1  ). Deﬁning ¯ | = d
13d (zf +l nd) as
the non-distorted real output, and normalizing at 1 the previous period price
level, we can rewrite the above equation as:
{ =(   





¢31 (|  ¯ |)
To derive the government balanced budget equation (3) start from
\ = JH[S (A6)














, equation (3) obtains.
Appendix B — Figure outcomes
In this appendix we derive the iso-losses and reaction functions depicted in
the ﬁgures (i.e. in the space ({>j  ˜ j)).
The union’s iso-loss curves are directly obtained from equation (4) by
using (1), (3) and the rational expectations constraint:




jx(j  e j)2
2
The government’s iso-loss is:










2 + ji (j  ˜ j)
2
¾
and its reaction function is:





22In this class of models wages are pre-determined w.r.t. prices; thus nominal wages are
set conditionally to the price level expectation.
15since C{
Cj = C
Cw  1= 1
1+p  1= p
1+p.







Similarly for the government we obtain:
¯ P = {0>˜ j}
which is however unfeasible since it implies ˜ { = ˜ j. By considering the
additional constraint ˜ {  0 (i.e.˜ j  jA{+˜ j), the government’s preferred















i m p l y i n gal a b o rd i s t o r t i o ne q u a lt oz e r o( ˜ { =0 ). It is easy to verify that
P lays above the government’s reaction function. This happens for reasons
discussed in the text.
Appendix C — Stackelberg solution
The non-cooperative Stackelberg solution is derived as follows. From (1),
(6), (7) we obtain the ﬁscal policymaker’s reaction function
w =
ji (1 + p)
2 ˜ j  (i + d2
p)(˜ { + h)
2
p + di +( 1+p)
2 ji
Imposing rational expectations, it is then straightforward to show that the
trade union’s loss function (4) is minimized by
˜ { =
[i + 2
p + jip(1 + p)]
£
i + 2




ji (1 + p)
2 + jx(2
p + i)
2 ˜ {  ˜ j
16The corresponding equilibrium outcomes (point S in the ﬁgures) are:23
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